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ABSTRACT 
By focusing on the divergence between mainstream framings of Okinawa, actual policies 
directed towards the Ryukyu Islands and the sociopolitical reality on these outlying islands, 
this article reexamines the often misrepresented role of Okinawan agency. In so doing, it 
focuses on the various narratives of Okinawa and the key terms that have articulated them in 
the post-reversion era. It thereby adds explanatory power to extant structuralist and critical 
literatures, which have tended to suffer from monolithic descriptions of structural power and 
polemic approaches to American and Japanese governance of the Islands. Specifically, by 
analyzing a series of illustrative issue areas such as sexual and economic exploitation, 
environmental protection, and military security, the article uses an adapted form of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to trace how framings and policy have shifted since reversion to 
Japanese rule. This focuses on primarily on Prime Ministerial statements from the National 
Diet and other, mostly Japanese language-based, materials relating to Okinawa’s governance. 
These are contrasted with short case studies highlighting the disconnect between rhetoric 
and reality. Ultimately, the evidence points to a decoupling of mainstream narratives from 
the on-the-ground reality. The article thereby provides a nuanced understanding and 
expression of Okinawa's complex interests and agency. 
                                                          




As the main island of the Ryūkyū Chain, Okinawa is the so-called ‘Cornerstone of the Pacific’.2  
It lies in a pivotal geostrategic position between China and Japan, on the fault-line of current 
superpower rivalries, with the Ryūkyūs3 effectively comprising the island-chain frontier of a 
United States (US)-Japan security alliance which is seeking to strategically encircle China.4 As 
a legacy of the Allies’ victory in World War II and as a continued function of US strategic 
interests throughout the post-war era5, Okinawa still hosts close to seventy five per cent of all 
US military bases in Japan. It also houses an increasing number of Japan Self Defense Force 
(JSDF) facilities.6 The base construction, or so-called relocation plan, for Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), off-shore of Okinawa’s Main Island is emblematic of this 
fortification. The replacement base, to be situated directly on top of a pristine coral reef which 
it will obliterate, has faced majority opposition from the prefecture’s residents and political 
representatives alike.7 It thus represents a microcosm for how, despite lofty rhetoric, Okinawan 
agency – defined broadly here in terms of the diverse interests of those resident on Okinawa – 
is treated indifferently when it comes to governance of these contested islands.8  
 
Indeed, there is increasing suspicion that this new facility at Henoko, ostensibly for US forces 
as a replacement for Futenma, will in fact ultimately be used by the JSDF.9 Contextualized 
                                                          
2 Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 September 2012. 
3 Okinawa is by extension the official Japanese name for the country’s 47th (last-named) 
prefecture, which is comprised of several of the widely dispersed Ryukyu Island chain. 
4 Son and Mason. ‘Building a maritime ‘great wall’ to contain China?’, 437-442; Pilger, ‘The 
Coming War with China’. 
5 Gabe, Resistant Islands, 62. 
6 Okinawa Times, 26 May 2015. 
7 Okinawa Times, 22 February 2017; Rabson, ‘Henoko and the U.S. Military’, 1-3. 
8 McCormack and Norimatsu, Okinawa no ikari. 
9 Akadome, ‘‘Henoko shinkichi’ ga hoshii no wa beikoku de wa naku bōeishō  
da’; Ikeo, Okada and Mason, ‘Watashi ni yokute anata ni ii yonaguni’. 
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among other complex socioeconomic issues on the Islands, this protracted base project brings 
into focus how the policy-setting agenda enacted by Tokyo’s central government is decoupled 
from the narratives of development, burden bearing and deterrence, which have been dominant 
buzzwords articulating its post-reversion Okinawa policy.10 At the same time, however, while 
the dubious motives for promulgating these narratives have been well-covered in the extant 
literature, sweeping critiques of the US and Japanese central governments have often 
obfuscated the nuances and conflicting reality of Okinawan agency in responding to 
governance issues on the Islands. 
 
Therein, the article that follows sheds new light upon the relationship between the dominant 
terminology used to depict Okinawa, related policy formation, and the complexity of Okinawan 
agency in response. As such, it provides an original perspective that builds upon existing 
discursive literature and avoids overreliance upon both structural (realist) and radical (critical) 
interpretations of Okinawa’s contemporary history. This is achieved through an interpretive 
critical discourse analysis (CDA)11, by spotlighting how policies directed towards Okinawa 
have been implemented from the highest levels of government via their framing under key 
terms, such as those cited above. In multifold form, it is argued that these have misrepresented 
the gap between specific political objectives and focus points, and the unfolding sociopolitical 
reality on Okinawa. In this sense, the article aims to articulate a range of everyday voices from 
Okinawa which are otherwise largely unarticulated by government, mass-media and academia.  
 
                                                          
10 Development here corresponds primarily to the Japanese terms shinkō and kaihatsu, 
burden to futan and deterrence to yokushiryoku. 
11 Wodak, Critical Discourse Analysis, 186. 
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Analysis of the extant scholarship on contemporary Okinawa exposes endemic tendencies of 
contrasting over-emphases upon structural power politics on the one hand 12  and over-
identification of a victimized Okinawan population on the other.13 This has resulted in polemic 
approaches towards both Japan’s central government and the US military14, which inhibits a 
balanced interpretation of how leading actors have actually driven narratives articulating 
Okinawa’s identity, whilst directing policies that diverge from them on Okinawa. In contrast, 
this article engages with a discursive body of evidence that tackles pivotal issues such as sexual 
and economic exploitation, environmental (mis)management and protection, and (military) 
security from the perspective of Okinawan agency. This serves to illustrate the disconnection 
between prominent narratives and the on-the-ground realities that they misrepresent. In 
conclusion, the primary findings express how Okinawa and the complex agency manifest 
within it has been repeatedly miscast via monolithic buzzwords disseminated through Japan’s 
state authorities, leading media outlets and academics. Okinawa’s diverse interests have 
thereby been largely marginalized by prefecture-specific policies, but these are themselves also 
found to be decoupled from the key terms that supposedly represent them.15       
 
Framings of Okinawa policy: From development and burden to deterrence 
Methodologically, in order to understand how Okinawa has been framed by Japan’s 
mainstream political discourse, the present study utilizes simplified interpretive critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) which, as discussed further below, interprets how power is 
articulated and transferred through the intertextual use of language.16 In Okinawa’s case, this 
                                                          
12 Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan; Abe, Atarashii kuni e utsukushii kuni e. 
13 Ota, Essays on Okinawa Problems; Takara, Okinawa seikatsushi; McCormack and 
Norimatsu. 
14 Ōkubo, Gensō no shima okinawa; Hoshino, ‘Okinawa no beigun kichi mondai to ningen no 
anzenhoshō’. 
15 Mason, ‘Japan’s change in military outlook marks the end of a ‘Peace State’’. 
16 Wood and Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis, 21-22. 
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process is identified with reference to terminology that is used in relation to certain kinds of 
policy trajectories. The CDA therefore helps to illustrates how, through time, a particular set 
of key-terms shape a given political issue – often in detachment from actual policymaking. To 
this effect, the article contrasts (Prime)ministerial-level Diet minutes that directly discuss 
projects and policies on Okinawa with case studies of policy outcomes that illuminate  vested-
interests driving the political economy of sectors such as tourism, concrete and sexual services. 
This spotlights the evolution and recurring instrumentalization of three pivotal key terms: 
development17, burden and deterrence.18   
 
Specifically, usage of these terms is shown to be driven by leading postwar political actors in 
Tokyo, who have tended to narrow the focus of contentious issues, ahistorically, to the post-
reversion era.19 This ahistorical framing ignores Okinawa’s independent history and leans 
towards identifying Okinawans as essentially victims of American, rather than Japanese, 
subjugation. Post-reversion, the need for development was emphasized under Japanese 
governance, as was the burden bearing of US military facilities stationed throughout the 
prefecture. In the post-9/11 years, however, this has undergone a shift, as the explanation that 
the regional security environment has become more severe was used to reframe Okinawa as 
part of an (essential) new security strategy.20  This places a heavy emphasis on the deterrence 
embodied by US military bases on the islands.21  
 
                                                          
17 Matsui, Okinawa shinkō no kadai to kongo no shinkōsaku no arikata, 137. 
18 MOD, ‘Zaioki beikaiheitai no ‘yokushiryoku’ ni kansuru shitsumon ni taisuru tōbensho’. 
19 Yōsuke Tsuruho, Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems, 7 December 
2016.  
20 Hosoya, ‘The Role of Japan’s National Security Council’, 2. 
21 Newsham, ‘US military bases on Okinawa: Still an essential deterrence’. 
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In this regard, the Japanese government-led narratives of Okinawa’s contemporary history 
largely ignore the brutal antecedents of its current rule by Tokyo’s authorities22, as well as the 
geostrategic motives that have underpinned policy throughout the periods identified above.23 
Such narratives also neglect the majority of Okinawan interests and the changes that the islands 
have undergone as a function of intensified assimilation and centralized Japanese 
administration. In that sense, the article also uses CDA to underline the extent to which 
government policy on Okinawa has been decoupled not only from the concepts manifest in the 
identified key terms, but also from Okinawan agency itself. It thereby spotlights a plethora of 
marginalized everyday voices on the ground. In so doing, the process by which Okinawa-policy 
reflects a strategic but misleading depiction of security logics articulated by Tokyo’s leading 
policy makers is revealed, but the complexity of Okinawan agency – as being far from 
monolithic in its responses – is also exposed.  
 
Interpreting political terminology 
In the sections that follow, an adapted version of multimodal CDA (MmDA)24 – originally 
initiated by political scientists as a research tool for synthesizing linguistics methods with 
aspects of psychoanalysis and identity theory25 – is applied to a range of selected National Diet 
records (focusing particularly on Prime Ministerial statements), media reports and other 
materials. These cover Okinawa’s governance and status from the post-Reversion era to the 
present day. Here, in contrast to proponents of MmDA that typically posit a decentralization 
of language26, this adaptation utilizes the intersubjective and inter-relational interpretation of 
discourse representative of the MmDA approach in its application to each of the sources listed 
                                                          
22 Namihira, Kindai higashiajiashi no naka no ryūkyū heigō, 32-33. 
23 Yoshida, ‘US Bases, Japan and the Reality of Okinawa as a Military Colony’, 5-7. 
24 Paltridge, Discourse Analysis, 69. 
25 See Martinez Lirola, Multimodal Analysis, 248, for an illustrative example. 
26 Norris, What is a Mode?, 155-169. 
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above, but retains a linguistic focus in terms of how these are understood to facilitate the 
articulation of politically motivated narratives. Specifically, this effects a critical interpretation 
of the stated key terms through a diachronic analysis that compares their usage by political 
actors with related policy outcomes on Okinawa. In particular, this allows for an informed 
assessment of how discourses identified with development, burden and deterrence became 
widely disseminated, and how they have contrasted with policymaking and local interests. The 
qualitative application of CDA is thereby employed to expose, diachronically, how a series of 
state-level security objectives have dominated Okinawa-policy. These are presented in 
contradistinction to successive mainstream narratives that are shown to be largely decoupled 
from the complex facets of Okinawan agency which they impact upon. 
 
This discursive data provides a nuanced understanding of how certain types of framings, 
prominently represented by these three key terms, have been symptomatic of Okinawa’s 
subjugation and governance, but also excavates how they miscast Okinawan agency as being 
both monolithic and uniformly victimized. The study therein includes sub-foci on specific 
issues that have often contributed to misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Okinawan 
agency across a broad spectrum of the extant literature.27 In addition, the combined body of 
data, as a whole, acts as a case study to illustrate more broadly how political discourse and 
security policy in Japan have witnessed transformative changes in recent decades.28 These 
amount to political doctrines that have undergone substantive transitions since Okinawa’s 
                                                          
27 For further discussion of the misrepresentation of complex Okinawan agency and 
identities, intersecting state, market and societal spheres, see Matsumura, The Limits of 
Okinawa; Figal, Beachheads and Inoue, Okinawa and the US Military.  
28 Glosserman and Kang, ‘The Myth of Japanese Remilitarization’. 
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reversion29, and are distinguishable from more temporary policy shifts typically associated with, 
for example, particular leadership figures.30  
 
Extant understandings: Agency and policy on Okinawa 
Structuralist (mostly realist-based) approaches tend to understand local-level policy on 
Okinawa primarily as a function of the competing interests of great powers. This includes Japan 
and the United States’ dual-jurisdiction over the Ryūkyū Islands.31 Closer examination of the 
political processes occurring within Okinawa, however, allows for a shift of focus, from the 
structure of the US-Japan alliance towards the triangulated, agency-led, relationship 
comprising the US, Japan and Okinawa. The Prefecture’s position within this triangle is 
endemically weak, 32 but is also analytically distinct from the key terms that have typically been 
used to frame it since its reversion.  
 
Okinawa’s role in the Vietnam War and American willingness to approve reversion illustrate 
this to good effect. American bases on Okinawa were extensively utilized to launch combat 
missions into the conflict, but the spiraling costs of operations meant that US lawmakers were 
eager to find a way to reduce expenditure in the region.33 This included abandoning the costly 
responsibility of administering and investing in Okinawa’s civilian government and placating 
its dissatisfied residents.34 In its place, Japan’s growing economic power took up the slack in 
terms of financial support for Okinawa, including the so-called sympathy budget, or omoiyari 
yosan, which sees Japanese public funds transferred from Tokyo to Washington in order to 
                                                          
29 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization, 35-37. 
30 Asahi Shimbun, 21 December 2016; Hatoyama, ed., Higashiajia kyōdōtai to okinawa no 
mirai; Ota, ‘Okinawa kokusai heiwakenkyūjo’. 
31 Kurōzuappu Gendai, ‘‘Henoko isetsu’ tairitsu no shinsō’. 
32 Yamaguchi and Arakawa, The Demise of the Ryukyu Kingdom, viii-ix. 
33 Mitchel, ‘Vietnam: Okinawa’s forgotten war’, 5. 
34 Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, ‘Battle of Okinawa’. 
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subsidize the expenses of US security forces stationed in Japan.35  At the same time, on 
Okinawa, the US government negotiated the almost total continuation of post-reversion base 
operations. This ensured that existing warfighting capabilities were sustained, but subsidized 
by Japan – keeping the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) much as it was on the islands prior 
to their legal return.36 
 
In accounting for agency within these processes, critical scholarship, including approaches that 
utilize discourse analyses to focus on the use of key terms for political ends37, as well as 
ethnographic studies, presents an obvious alternative to structural interpretations. Balanced 
analysis of Okinawan agency in such literature, however, has suffered from a tendency to be 
undermined by accounts lacking full acknowledgment of the fact that leading political 
organizations and actors have remained broadly committed to the Ryūkyū Islands’ reversion 
to Japanese rule – rather than promoting independence or emancipation from Japanese 
oppression. Support for separatist movements, for instance, was effectively subsumed within 
pro-reversion movements 38 , ultimately leading to a more transnational approach to 
operationalizing anti-authority agency from within the Prefecture.39  
 
Nevertheless, revised attempts by both academics and local interest groups have been made to 
portray Okinawa as the victim of on-going colonization40, including presenting Okinawan 
interests from proto-nationalist and historical nationalist positions. However, while normative 
value may be added by such in countering the oppression suffered by Okinawans, critical 
                                                          
35 Okinawa Times, 17 December 2015. 
36 Sato, Amerika seiji to zaioki beigun kichi, 231-232. 
37 Norimatsu, ‘Hatoyama Trumps Mubarak’, 11-12. 
38 Sakurazawa, Okinawa dokuritsu ron no kentō. 
39 Dietz, ‘Transnationalism and Transition in the Ryūkyūs’, 212. 
40 Arazato and Ōshiro, Kindai okinawa no ayumi; Tanji, Myth Protest and Struggle in 
Okinawa; Takahashi, Okinawa ‘fukki’ no kōzō. 
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literature typically needs to show a greater self-awareness of its own biases. This is particularly 
in terms of misrepresenting the complex and sometimes contradictory political, social and 
economic interests of many on the Islands, who clearly do not fit the monolithic framing of 
Okinawa as a unitary victim. The discussion that follows thereby seeks to abridge a growing 
body of research and scholarship in the area of critical Okinawan studies41, which has thus far 
struggled to gain a wide readership or effectively engage with regional and global counterparts. 
It also highlights how Okinawa’s complex agency is reflective of the negligible sentiments of 
Ryukyuan nationalist identity now felt within the Prefecture.42 
 
Conversely, though, critical approaches do help to illustrate how contemporary Okinawa-
policy continues a tradition of dividing and ruling the prefecture,43 as described in detail by 
Lim Chuan-tiong’s depiction of the Meiji era disposal of the Ryukyus, or ryukyu shobun, for 
instance.44 Furthermore, Lim’s focus on recent history aids in contextualizing current moves 
to expand and relocate military bases on the Islands. Here, critical scrutiny of dubious security 
narratives emanating from central authorities in both the US and Japan has been invaluable in 
providing a more objective representation of the on-the-ground reality.45  Within this, the 
process of “identifying Okinawa as the other”, or okinawa no tashaka46, is exposed as part of 
a revisionist appraisal of Japanese national identity, which has been subtly extended to this day. 
Indeed, such forms of nationalist exclusionism reach to the very core of how Japan’s central 
authorities have utilized political rhetoric to harness power over Okinawan governance 
                                                          
41 Arakawa and Oguma, Oguma kenkyū 1; Takara, Okinawa seikatsushi; Arasaki, Kankō kōsu 
de nai okinawa; Gabe; Matsushima, Ryukyu dokuritsuron. 
42 Mason, ‘Japan’s change in military’, 20. 
43 Matsumura, The Limits of Okinawa. 
44 Lim, ‘Identity Politics in ‘Peripheral East Asia’’, 42-43. 
45 The Asahi Shimbun Company, Media, Propaganda and Politics in 20th-Century Japan, 183-
184; Okinawa Times, 29 August 2015. 
46 Takahashi, Okinawa ‘fukki’ no kōzō, 44. 
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issues.47 Concomitantly, Okinawa’s tendency to be “made an exception of to the rule”, or 
reigaika48, has continued throughout the post-revision period, and remains central to how the 
US and Japanese governments implement exceptional laws and policies on Okinawa today.49  
 
In sum, then, the extant literature has tended to project polemic framings that risk 
misrepresenting Okinawa’s contemporary political economy and wider society too uniformly. 
After all, a majority of the Okinawan population now oppose independence and view 
themselves as Japanese, as well as Okinawan.50 Hence, in order to offer an alternative to broad-
brush, structuralist, approaches adopted within the mainstream literature, there is a need to 
deconstruct their monolithic framings – typically expressed using the terms identified within 
this article – that have underpinned discussion of the prefecture throughout the post-reversion 
era. In addition, reconstruction of a more accurate depiction of the multitude of voices that 
reflect sociopolitical reality on Okinawa is also required. The sections below initiate this by 
contextualizing these key terms in relation to a range of examples from the post-reversion era 




Although in terms of absolute frequency, use of the term ‘development’ in relation to Okinawa 
became particularly prominent between the years 1982 and 2001, its relative rhetorical primacy 
within Diet sessions initially emerged in the first decade after reversion (See Figure 1.1). The 
                                                          
47 Meisels, Territorial Rights (2nd Edition); Moore, National Self-Determination and Secession; 
Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
48 Takahashi, 46-7. 
49 Suda, Yabe and Maedomari, Hondo no ningen wa shiranai ga, 83. 
50 Takara, Yokuda and Kuramoto, ‘Can we measure ‘Okinawan Identity’?’, 136; Yoron What 




narrative of development can therein be measured quantitatively, as well as qualitatively, as 
made further evident by its frequent usage in justifying financial policies directed towards the 
prefecture. Development was also a key term in political competition over which party could 
assert their credentials to best provide it. For example, immediately after reversion, Finance 
Committee representative, Kitada Eisaku, alluded to the need, “for the sake of Okinawa’s 
development to be paying particular attention to Okinawa’s special circumstances, economic 
situation and social conditions and such like”51 when setting up new economic policies directed 
specifically at the prefecture.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1.1. Post-Reversion Diet References to Selected Okinawan Issues 
 
Succeeding Kitada’s address, in the five premierships of the first post-reversion decade, 
successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Ministers echoed his position emphatically. 
This repeatedly coupled development with reductions to US military facilities, although such 
rhetoric came to bear little resemblance to the actual trajectory of policy implementation in the 
Ryūkyūs. Prior to being disgraced, Tanaka Kakuei, for instance, asserted to the Budget 
Committee that “[w]ith regards pushing ahead with the Okinawa Development Plan…we have 
determined that there will be a reduction to Okinawa’s bases…[as this is] absolutely 
necessary.”52 Miki Takeo, likewise, stated that “…in tackling Okinawa’s development, I aim 
to continue to fully engage in actively promoting it forthwith.” 53  Once again, Miki also 
reinforced Japanese premiers’ ongoing separation of Okinawans and mainlanders by preceding 
his speech with the backhanded statement that the recent Okinawa International Ocean 
Exposition event of 1975 had been a success partly because “it allowed Okinawans and 
                                                          
51 Finance Committee, 25 May 1972. 
52 Budget Committee, 10 November 1972. 
53 Main Session, 26 January 1976. 
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mainland Japanese to form a heartfelt bond”54– as if they had previously been somehow unable 
to do so!  
 
Incoming Prime Minister, Fukuda Takeo, further echoed Tanaka and Miki’s sentiments, in 
places almost verbatim. To this effect, he contended in one statement that “[c]oncerning 
Okinawa’s development, I am inclined to believe that we must continue to make every effort 
to step up efforts forthwith.”55 Further, the specific use of development by Japanese leaders, as 
an overarching key term used to approximate sweeping positive progress on Okinawa, 
continued through the next two administrations. Prime Minister, Ōhira Masayoshi, for instance, 
claimed that his government were, “…with regards Okinawa’s promotion and development, 
responding to the on-the-ground situation with the concept of actively extending effective 
policies” 56 , while his successor, Suzuki Zenkō, defended this emphasis in stating that 
“…development and promotion have been pushed forward in accordance with the [Okinawa] 
development plan, and are bearing proportional results”.57 Here too, it is notable that Suzuki, 
like those before and after him, continued to focus on a distinction between Okinawans and 
other Japanese, and link development to ameliorating such a division, “in order to nullify the 
gap between Okinawa Prefecture and the mainland”58, whilst at the same time, contrarily, 
reasserting its continuity. In this sense, the generalized use of development as a key term to 
convey a plethora of positive changes confirms its central role in articulating state-led policy 
agendas.59   
 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 Main Session, 15 March 1977. 
56 Main Session, 25 January 1980. 
57 Cabinet Committee, 25 May 1981. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Figal, Beachheads, 181-184.  
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The contradiction, between promoting Okinawa’s prosperity to the level of mainland Japan on 
the one hand and retrenching its distinctive status on the other, has therein been symptomatic 
of the Islands’ framing and governance since their reversion.6061 This initially centered on an 
overemphasis within Diet statements upon the expression and articulation of development, but 
also involved leading politicians resorting to less ambiguous forms of deception.62 In the Diet 
itself this was illustrated by PM Tanaka, for instance, when he asserted in response to 
allegations of prohibited nuclear weapons deposits on the Islands that, “…including Okinawa, 
there are no nuclear weapons in our country.”63 It was later revealed not only that nuclear 
weapons had been stored on Okinawa before and after reversion,64  but also that this had 
effectively been agreed upon, including their concealment – to varying degrees of 
understanding – by former PM, Sato Eisaku, then Defence Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, and 
high-ranking members of the US government, such as Henry Kissinger and Melvin Laird.65 
Nakasone, in fact, when trying to obtain a more stringent commitment on the removal of 
nuclear weapons from Okinawa, faced Laird’s repost that the word of the US president should 
be sufficient reassurance.66 In this case, that would mean trusting the incumbent Richard Nixon 
– a man later to be embroiled in the Watergate scandal, and often viewed as an embodiment of 
duplicity.67 The discussion above highlights, then, not only how mainstream discourse on 
Okinawa’s development contains politicized usage of that term, but also how a narrative of 
development was at-times deliberately falsified. 
                                                          
60 Mason, ‘Nationalism in Okinawa’, 20. 
61 For comparison/continuation, see also Abe Shinzō, Main Diet Session, 14 February 2017. 
62 Jimbo and Miyadai, Okinawa no shinjitsu, 188. 
63 Upper House Main Session, 1 November 1972. 
64 National Security Archive, ‘Nuclear Weapons on Okinawa Declassified December 2015’. 
65 Hunt, Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 330-346. 
66 Ibid., 46. 




Discourse vs. policy and agency 
Contrary to the discourse of development exhibited by Japan’s leaders, Tokyo’s Okinawa-
policy has been determined primarily by a perceived need to couple domestic political stability 
under the right-of-center LDP administration with US-led national security interests.68 This is 
illustrated by descriptions of various phenomenon embedded within Okinawan society and 
political economy. Therein, usage of the same key terms becomes less prominent or abandoned 
altogether. For example, the development narrative has often been deliberately avoided by 
politicians hailing from all sides – despite being integral to achieving policy objectives – when 
discussing controversial sectors such as the entertainment industry. Here, in order to maintain 
relative social order on the Islands, particularly during the final years of the Vietnam War and 
thereafter, an official policy of extraterritoriality for US personnel under the SOFA worked in 
tandem with an unofficial local-level policy of promoting the industry (mostly in the form of 
prostitution) and proliferating narcotics usage.69 This was initially via the semi- and fully-
coerced use of young Okinawan women, later also using foreign women who came to the 
prefecture as immigrants.70 In this sense, given the continuing and urgent need for grass-roots-
level employment opportunities in post-reversion Okinawa, Japanese and American 
government authorities were either complicit in or indifferent to de facto policies of developing 
and perpetuating illicit trades and industries. Furthermore, despite lofty rhetoric of increased 
development initiatives in the name of brining Okinawa in-line, or hondo-nami, with the 
Japanese mainland, an extensive portion of economic activity in this industry centered around 
a system absent on the mainland. This involved young women being forced by their families 
                                                          
68 Hunt, 332-3. 
69 Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’, 2. 
70 OPNLA, ‘Current Issues in Post-Reversion Okinawa’, 1. 
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and employers into commercializing their bodies for financial gain, and compounded a 
socioeconomic structure in which Okinawa’s official per capita income remained the lowest in 
the country and unemployment among the highest.71 Okinawa became the prefecture where 
sex and drugs were traded more freely than any other in Japan, ironically widening the gap 
between the Ryūkyūs and the mainland Japanese society it was supposedly set to emulate 
through renewed development.72 Yet, Okinawan agency in this regard remained complex and 
divided, as for many working in these sectors the economic benefits outweighed the social 
costs of engaging in such industries, despite being the cause of widespread resentment, anti-
American sentiment and social decay.73 
 
In contradistinction to the entertainment industry, the flagship project of the development 
narrative in this period was the Expo75 international trade fair. This, however, was also not 
free of controversies. In its inception, it sought to demonstrate both the reality of Okinawa’s 
newly reverted (Japanese) sovereignty and the extensive socioeconomic benefits that 
Okinawa’s commercialization, commodification and resortification could bring.74 In fact, as 
Vivian Blaxell curtly notes, “[t]his production of commodity tourism constituted an important 
dimension of the mask of Japanese sovereignty in Okinawa. Beach resorts, ocean landscapes, 
theme parks and packaged representations of Ryukyuan culture concealed the facts of the 
American war machine and Japanese complicity with it.”75 In this regard, it should be noted 
that not only did the Expo75 deflect attention away from the issue of the United States’ 
unabated continuance of military operations directed from the Ryukyus76, but also that the 
                                                          
71 Statistics Bureau, ‘Labor Force Survey’. 
72 JFBA, ‘Okinawa fukki nishūnen ni atatte’. 
73 Hook and Siddle, Japan and Okinawa, 2-14. 
74 Naha City Museum of History, ‘Okinawa kokusai kaiyō hakurankai kanren shiryō’. 
75 Blaxell, ‘Preparing Okinawa for Reversion to Japan’, 4. 
76 Sakaiya, ‘Okinawa kaiyōhakurankai wa seikō datta ka’. 
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narrative of Okinawan development was misleading in terms of its suggestion that immediate 
and widespread economic benefits for Okinawans would be forthcoming. In fact, although 
Expo75 and its affiliated projects did receive heavy government and quasi-governmental 
investment, the contracting of giant construction companies, such as Mitsubishi and Fuyō, 
amongst others, to undertake major infrastructural improvements set an early precedent for 
how Japan’s large mainland companies would dominate and exploit the principal economic 
development opportunities that exist on Okinawa. The profits of such investment have thereby 
continued to flow principally into the coffers of giant – typically former zaibatsu conglomerate 
– firms, and provide only a minimal trickle-down effect for the majority of Okinawa’s residents, 
despite a widespread perception within the prefecture that the Expo was for the benefit of all, 
with almost universal backing from local residents.77 
 
Expo75 and other projects depicted under the umbrella term of development also distracted 
attention away from protracted US military occupation for the sake of (America’s) national 
defense interests.78 Here too, the decoupling of political rhetoric from concrete policies was 
stark. While Japan’s political leaders sustained the portrayal of high levels of government 
investment and improving socioeconomic conditions on Okinawa, the US military continued 
to rely heavily on its multiple on-island bases and eventually increased deployments to some 
25,000 service members.79 With this, the endemic and much-criticized problems of noise 
pollution, heinous crimes and restricted land usage caused by the heavy US military presence 
continued. Indeed, the troops were in evident obstruction of Okinawa’s wider objective 
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development, apart from the limited short-term economic contribution provided by (mostly on-
base) employment and the grey-sector pleasure services already discussed above.  
 
At the same time, this was also an era of governmental investment facilitating the development 
of large sections of Okinawa’s virgin coastline (concretely by way of urbanization and 
industrialization) via land reclamation and other concrete industry-driven infrastructure 
projects. Moreover, in terms of agency, most were encouraged and actively endorsed by local 
authorities and interest groups in the name of development. These witnessed the massive 
destruction of marine ecosystems surrounding Okinawa’s Main Island, including the polluting 
of rivers and other waterways through reckless use of pesticides and cleaning products, as well 
as the decimation of fish stocks off the coast of industrialized zones, such as those stretching 
north and south of the Prefectural capital, Naha.80 These initiatives were, then, directed by a 
complex intersection of private commercial, central (Japanese) government, US military and 




In transition from the immediate post-reversion years, the 1980s saw the rise of a narrative of 
burden increasingly projected into mainstream political discourse, which has continued into 
the 21st century (See Figure 1.1). This emerged in particular under the Nakasone Yasuhiro 
administration. Nakasone sought to rationalize and foster close US-Japan security relations as 
part of a broader subtext of the Cold War, famously referring to Japan as the US’ “unsinkable 
aircraft carrier” in the Western Pacific. 81  Okinawa was, therein, portrayed as central to 
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maintaining a sufficient deterrence against the Soviet Union and its allies. In this sense, the 
burden borne by Okinawans referred to a disproportionate but supposedly necessary stationing 
of US troops on the Ryūkyū Islands, including a heavy contingent of offensive (rather than 
defensive) Marines under the pretext of national security.82 
 
In the Diet, Nakasone lauded that, “We hope to work towards rationalization of th[e] bases as 
far as possible, but they [Okinawans] are shouldering the burden for an important mission in 
terms of all the aims of our national defense, as well as confirming the validity of the US-Japan 
Security Alliance.83 Nakasone’s successor, Takeshita Noboru, then reinforced this framing of 
Okinawa and Okinawans by the LDP administration, claiming that, “[use of the bases] is a 
lynchpin in achieving our objectives under the US-Japan Security Alliance, and…I believe this 
must be attributed to the understanding and cooperation of all Okinawans.”84  
 
The consistency and broader use of this key term is also striking. In response, Okinawan Diet 
members, media actors and others from within the prefecture exercised their agency 
combatively towards this articulation of centralized governance over their islands. This did 
little, however, to prevent a succession of bureaucrats, Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers 
continuing to justify policy trajectories by referring to the burden which Okinawans were 
portrayed as painfully, but necessarily, shouldering. And, as with the discussion of 
development, calls by Japan’s leaders for “understanding and cooperation”85 from Okinawans 
in accepting such a burden were presented as reasonable, responsible and in the public interest86 
                                                          
82 Sonoda, ‘Beigun izon’, 1-2. 
83 Upper House Main Session, 14 September 1983. 
84 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Main Session, 31 March 1988. 
85 Kaifu Toshiki, Main Session, 15 March 1991. 
86 Ibid., Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 June 1990. 
20 
 
– despite being inconsistent with the range of policies being implemented by the central 
government in Okinawa Prefecture.  
 
Here, the transition of focus from development to burden illustrates a subtle shift, whereby the 
term, burden, became only relatively more prominent in shaping how Okinawa was framed by 
leading political and media actors on the Japanese mainland. Indeed, Prime Ministers, 
Takeshita and Kaifu, for instance, retained development within the same statements in which 
they had requested “cooperation and understanding” from Okinawans with regards to the heavy 
burden of US bases that they bear. The post-reversion emphasis on prioritizing Okinawa’s 
development, however, moved towards spotlighting the necessity of the Islands to continue 
hosting US military forces in large numbers, with the target audience of Okinawa becoming 
the referent object, in the context of justifying related security measures.87 Many statements 
from leading lawmakers were, therefore, directed explicitly at Okinawans, but were in one 
sense actually rhetoric spouted tactically on behalf of, or targeting, mainland Japan’s electorate. 
The aim was thereby to identify with mainlanders’ collective feelings of guilt towards Okinawa 
– as the only prefecture which had to suffer both a full US invasion and land-battle during 
World War II, as well as a disproportionally long occupation thereafter. Concomitantly, an 
attempt appears to have been made by Japan’s ruling elite to “manufacture [mainstream] 
consent”88 for its stance on US base hosting among the wider Japanese population.  
 
Discourse vs. policy and agency 
Akin to the smokescreen of development, the narrative of burden bearing also served to distract 
attention away from controversial aspects of Okinawa-policy, and was effected for audiences 
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on both the Japanese mainland and Okinawa itself. In particular, due to burden’s association 
with land usage, noise pollution, and incidents and accidents suffered as the result of the heavy 
US military presence89, other kinds of burden bearing on Okinawa were widely ignored.90 This 
included large parts of the island’s fragile environment being decimated and unprecedented 
levels of toxic pollutants, brought onto Okinawa during the Vietnam War, being stored there. 
These conditions were in concomitance with the consolidation of economic dominance by large 
(mostly mainland-based) business interests and the entrenchment of extra bureaucratic offices 
attached to key central government ministries, used to oversee local governance. These 
included Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) (now Ministry 
of Defense (MOD)) branches specifically designated for dual oversight of Okinawan affairs.91 
The contrast between mainland and Okinawan agency in portraying this reality is also striking. 
Okinawa’s Prefectural Government, for example, regularly protested the multifaceted nature 
of Okinawa’s burden under the guise of developmental policies.92 Contrastingly, the framing 
of Okinawa’s burden by central authorities in Tokyo focused concertedly only on the US 
military presence itself. By so doing, the specifics of environmental destruction, economic 
cronyism and political controversy were widely ignored as a result.  
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Indeed, the US and Japanese central governments used the term burden in targeting what 
former Okinawan Governor, Inamine Keiichi, described as “points rather than lines”93, in order 
to tailor policy following flash-point incidents. This was in line with their temporally perceived 
security interests – rather than as a linear process adjusted in any meaningful way to meet the 
changing needs of most Okinawans. For instance, the headline case of a 12-year old girl raped 
by US marines in 1995 served as a catalyst to spark a review of Okinawa-policy that ultimately 
led to rationalizing US base facilities and inter-governmental legal provisions, but without any 
radical restructuring of existing governance structures. 94  The US-Japan Special Action 
Committee (SACO) is a case in point. Openly created in response to Okinawan protests, most 
prominently targeting the 1995 rape case, in fact this agreement (overseen almost exclusively 
by central authorities in Washington and Tokyo) led to only very limited land returns on 
Okinawa and the downscaling of expendable military installations. These included a renewed 
commitment to relocate MCAS Futenma to a new replacement facility, which was subsequently 
approved on the coral reef at Henoko in fruition of a relocation project that was actually first 
conceived of in the 1960s.95 The tragic incident of a child being gang-raped was, thereby, used 
tactically at the state level to headline Okinawa’s burden and the efforts Japanese central 
authorities were making to reduce it, whilst in-fact consolidating US troop deployments on the 
islands and further tightening cooperation in support of the US-Japan security alliance.96 Yet, 
while prefecture-wide opinion has remained against the relocation to Futenma, residents of the 
village of Henoko itself are overwhelmingly in favor of the base’s construction as a means to 
boost the ailing local economy. 97  This tension between competing local-level interests 
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therefore further reflects the complex agency of Okinawans in engaging with the top-down 




In the post-9/11 era, a further shift in mainstream framings of Okinawa has witnessed a shift 
of focus towards the term deterrence. Initially as a function of the War on Terror, and later in 
reference to broader security concerns, Okinawa has been identified as a key strategic location 
for securing Japan’s national defense within the context of current US-Japan security ties. 
Former Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirō, for example, referred to military deterrence in 
relation to the US presence on the Islands an unprecedented thirty-eight separate times between 
2004 and 2006 alone.98  Koizumi’s successors – both within his own LDP party and the 
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) – sustained this emphasis upon Okinawa’s role in 
providing a supposed deterrence. Conjunctively, references to the reduction of Okinawa’s 
burden were retained, but were consistently repositioned subordinately to the role of deterrence. 
For instance, Koizumi stated that:  
In addition to ensuring that the effective deterrence held by stationed American military 
forces is maintained, I believe we must pay due consideration to the burden placed on 
local authorities where there are American military facilities present in their locality. It 
is from this perspective that we will pursue ongoing cooperative discussions with the 
American side.99  
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This statement thereby illustrates the shift in emphasis upon the key terms used to portray 
Okinawa’s role in relation to the on-going structural dominance of the US and its influence 
over the prefecture’s governance. 
 
Koizumi’s articulation of this narrative of deterrence was, thereafter, reiterated and intensified 
by successive leaders, including Fukuda Yasuo and Asō Tarō, who asserted that “The Japanese 
and American sides share the understanding that, while maintaining our deterrence capabilities, 
it is possible to reduce the local burden borne by Okinawa.”100 Notably, despite their rival 
political positions, leading opposition figures, including DPJ PMs Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko 
Noda, also essentially sustained this form of rhetoric. Following inaugural DPJ premier, 
Hatoyama Yukio’s, failure to redirect either mainstream narratives or related policy on 
Okinawa101, Noda, for example, reconfirmed, in reference to deployment of the controversial 
US-made Osprey tilt-rotor military helicopter on the Islands, that:  
Due to their deployment on Okinawa, the capabilities of the Marines have been 
improved, in addition to improving the deterrence capabilities of the US-Japan alliance 
in the Asia Pacific region, which we understand to be of paramount importance to our 
national security.102  
Plagued by technical faults and combatable by hand-held pistol fire103, the Osprey deployment 
in fact offers little real deterrence. Yet, succeeding Noda, in return to LDP rule, PM Shinzō 
Abe also further decoupled the description of material capabilities on Okinawa from carefully 
worded rhetoric used to depict the Islands’ role in national defense.  
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Discourse vs. policy and agency 
Watching elderly protesters forced to the ground and dragged away by government-funded 
security guards in front of Camp Schwab, Henoko, this decoupling is made all the more 
apparent. Here the gap between mainstream rhetoric and on-the-ground reality, accentuated in 
the post-9/11 era, perpetuates the pretext of deterrence. As with the use of terms such as 
development and burden, pivotal issues and incident points have been used to promote this 
concept. These include: responses to the 2004 US helicopter crash into Okinawa International 
University (OIU)104, the Chinese trawler-Japanese Coastguard collision incident off-shore of 
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2010105, and North Korean missile tests.106 These 
highlight at least two further functions of the narrative of deterrence which are often overlooked. 
The first relates to military accidents, such as the notorious crash of an American CH-53D Sea 
Stallion helicopter into OIU, adjacent to MCAS Futenma.107 This caused outrage throughout 
Japan, although more so among local authorities and media broadcasters108, but the means by 
which it was incorporated into the discourse of deterrence, making Okinawa a function of the 
wider construct of national security was illustrative of the processes discussed above. This 
revolved around using the accident as further evidence of the dangers of MCAS Futenma and 
justification, therefore, for relocation to Henoko in order to relieve Okinawa’s burden. 
Contingently, the relocation was claimed to contribute towards the prefecture’s military 
deterrence. Hence, due to Henoko base’s construction – itself in violation of multiple Japanese 
laws109  – facing stiff prefecture-wide opposition, Japan’s central government, in agreement 
with the US, seized the opportunity to both continue operations at MCAS Futenma and duly 
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blame their inability to end them upon those seeking to block its relocation to Henoko. Indeed, 
relocation to Henoko has repeatedly been stressed as “the only viable option”110 in order to 
maintain a sufficient deterrence.111 Similarly to the cases where development and burden were 
utilized as key terms of justification, rather than central authorities articulating how the over-
deployment of bases and US service members is being imposed upon Okinawa regardless of 
local opinion and localized risks, the responsibility to host a deterrence (in the name of national 
security) has been reassigned to the Islands and their inhabitants. This is despite the fact that 
the majority of forces stationed on Okinawa do not, in military terms, provide an effective 
defensive deterrence. In particular, the Marines stationed at MCAS Futenma are an offensive 
force, which offer negligible ability to defend Okinawa (or Okinawans!) from external 
attack.112 
 
In addition, there is notable disparity between the use of political rhetoric, actual policy and 
the contradictory interests of Okinawans with regards to JSDF forces and facilities increasingly 
being deployed to fortify Okinawa. This initiative compliments the misrepresentation of the 
US military deterrence, but also masks a Japanese military build-up that has raised minimal 
domestic opposition. Indicative of this trend, are the cases of new JSDF facilities on outlying 
Ishigaki Island, Miyako Island and Yonaguni Island. 113  On Yonaguni in particular, local 
inhabitants of Japan’s sparsely populated western frontier have been swayed to accept the 
militarization of their natural environment and dilution of local government powers via 
economic incentives offered in return. These are comparable to those offered to local villagers 
at Henoko, and have once again been framed in terms of the necessity for increased 
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deterrence.114 Yet, the JSDF presence in itself presents unclear benefits by way of deterring 
any would-be regional threat – particularly as it may itself become a target of rival militaries.115 
This illustrates, then, how the narrative of deterrence in relation to Okinawa facilitates the 
diversification of national security policy initiatives and seeks to either coopt or diffuse local 
agency.  
 
It also highlights how Okinawa’s fragmented population has been misrepresented by much of 
the mainstream media and literature alike, but is the victim of monolithic counter-narratives 
created by local political actors and news media sources that oppose central government and 
US authorities. In this regard, the politically incorrect notion that “anyone in Okinawa can be 
bought”116, which is not incompatible with the discourse articulated via the key terms discussed 
above, suggests that while staunch resistance to American bases is certainly obfuscated by the 
central government’s fallacious narrative of deterrence, so too is the real nature of competing 
Okinawan interests. Indeed, overwhelming local support from within the village of Henoko (on 
economic grounds) for the relocation of the MCAS Futenma base to the offshore coral reef site 
there was forthcoming. And, in addition, Yonaguni and other outlying Islands’ have endorsed 
the new JSDF bases, as well as the recent concreting over of green-space reclaimed from US 
forces in Kitanakagusuku to create a lucrative giant mall complex, reinforcing the multifaceted 
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Ultimately, it is problematic to disentangle each of the key terms discussed above from what 
could be defined as an objective narrative. Nonetheless, each exist in juxtaposition to 
objectively distinguishable realities on Okinawa that contain a more diverse range of local 
voices and agency than can be expressed through the monolithic framings of development, 
burden and deterrence.119 In that sense, this article has illustrated how contemporary Okinawa 
has been characterized by false narratives, or narrative fallacies120 , since its reversion to 
Japanese rule. The discussion thereby highlighted how these narrative constructs have 
facilitated the decoupling of Okinawa-policy from the mainstream political rhetoric that frames 
it, but also how this process often leads to the further misrepresentation of Okinawan agency – 
as being predominantly uniform – rather than exposing its diverse composition. Deconstruction 
of these terms and their contested usage made clear the endurance of a system of governance 
on Okinawa that perpetuates the Prefecture’s political and economic division and rule, largely 
in disregard or cooption of the agency of its locally elected representatives and citizens, and in 
continued destruction of its marine environment.  
 
In this regard, the present article has built on both mainstream and critical literatures in offering 
a more nuanced account of Okinawa’s structure-agency composition than leading disciplinary 
paradigms have, as yet, been able to persuasively provide. This rests upon the understanding 
that, particularly in the post-reversion era, the reality of Okinawa’s governance revolves around 
its misrepresentation by leading politicians, media actors and others in positions of relative 
power, as well as politically active stakeholders on Okinawa itself. The essence of this process 
of false narration, then, is that by framing Okinawa as a unique other, particularly in terms of 
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its roles within the national political body of Japan, the actual trajectory and prioritization of 
government policies being implemented become obfuscated via the opaque rhetorical terms 
that broadly cover the concept of security. This has led to the relative neglect of important 
issues such as long-term socioeconomic disparity, environmental degradation and regional 
geo-strategy. These are also exacerbated by stereotypical framings of the Islands, a protracted 
US military presence and shortsighted policymaking.   
 
As highlighted in the analyses of contradictions between Diet statements made by successive 
premiers and the policies that they have overseen, this neglect has affected multiple areas of 
significance on Okinawa. These include: indifference towards forms of sexual exploitation in 
the name of development; massive degradation and pollution of marine ecosystems under the 
pretext of necessary burden, and a sustained offensively-oriented US (and increasingly 
Japanese) military presence framed as deterrence.121 From a normative perspective, which 
designates Okinawan agency as its first priority and seeks to engage more fully with Okinawan 
narratives, the central question is surely, then, how to create and disseminate more critical 
interpretations of Okinawan interests. These need to both expose existing false narratives and 
replace them with a depiction of Japan’s southernmost prefecture that redresses its enduring 
structural weaknesses. This is a project that requires a comprehensive process of reconciliation 
between Okinawa’s colonial past and present, and is likely to be realized only through 
constructive policy measures that ensure a less economically dependent and more politically 
independent future. Therein, the necessity for more consistent coupling of political narratives 
with the policies they frame is made abundantly clear.    
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